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PLURALISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
by Alan Geyer
Dr. Alan Geyer (United Methodist) is Professor of Political Ethics and Ecumenics at Wesley Theological
Seminary in Washington, DC; Resident Ethicist at Washington National Cathedral; and Senior Scholar of
The Churches' Center for Theology and Public Policy. Many of his numerous scholarly writings dealt with
East-West issues. This was a paper delivered at the Conference on "Christian Faith and Human Enmity"
Kecskemét, Hungary, August 24, 1995.

Any American invited to speak about the role of religion in the political conflicts of Europe must begin by
acknowledging the intensity of religious and political conflicts within the United States. In many ways, our
American constitutional tradition of separation of church and state that has been a vital guardian of
religious liberty--yet its specific implications remain confused and are bitterly embattled at present. Our
Christian communions remain splintered into more than two hundred varieties. The ferocity of strife within
most of our major communions, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox, reflects the so-called "culture
wars" that have recently shredded the fabric of our civil society. And there has been serious violence: over
sexuality, abortion, and militant cults--and a rise in anti-Semitic vandalism.
In America, as in most societies, religion is the source of serious problems, not just solutions. Any honest
discussion of religious freedom in a pluralistic society must begin with the confession that religion itself
has often been the enemy of freedom --and often the enemy of peace.
The religious pluralism of Europe today may seem to be a totally new reality. The collapse of communist
hegemony has loosed a welter of social forces: some primarily religious, others using religious labels for
primarily national, ethnic, or ideological purposes.
But religious pluralism itself is an old, old reality in Europe. Much of the political and military history of
Europe has revolved around religious differences. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 gave princes the
prerogative of choosing between Catholicism and Protestantism for their realms; it did not give individuals
the right to choose. The Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century represented a terrible Christian failure
to accommodate diversity, while the Peace of Westphalia at war's end only affirmed tolerance for interstate
diversity and not for religious freedom for individuals. Nevertheless, some European societies, especially in
the past thirty years, have achieved new levels of civility and concord among religious groups. One of the
conspicuous tragedies of former Yugoslavia is that peaceful pluralistic communities have been ravaged by
the deliberate inflammation of old religious wounds.
Far back beyond the modern history of Europe, however, is the reality that, at their very birth, the three
prominent world religions of Europe confronted religious pluralism all around them. Judaism originated
with Abraham's departure from the many gods, idols, and nature deities of Mesopotamia; Judaism's very
life has been shaped by exile and diaspora among the most diverse cultures and faiths. Christianity, in turn,
was born within Judaism but, at the Jerusalem Conference recounted in Acts 15, Christianity opened itself
to Gentiles--which meant confronting Greek philosophy and religion, mysticism, mystery cults, and the
gods of Rome. The history of Christian missions is the history of encounter with Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and animism. Islam began with the acknowledgment of its lineage from
Abraham and its honoring of Jesus as a prophet. The militant expansion of Islam alternated with the
militant expansion of European Christianity, both of which have left heavy historic burdens upon eastern
europe and the Middle east.
So pluralism is an old fact for all three world religions. Moreover, almost every Christian communion has
been both the victim and the perpetrator of discrimination, persecution, and violence vis-à -vis other
Christians and non-Christians. We have histories compounded of both grievances and the imperatives of
repentance. In most conflicts, repentance is the precondition of reconciliation.

One of the burdens of Christian history is that the mainstreams of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and
Protestantism were for so long unfavorable to democracy and to individual religious freedom as a human
right. All of the "Big Four" theologians of Western Christianity--Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin-gave ethical priority to order over justice. José Miquez Bonino, a former president of the World Council of
Churches, has written that for Augustine, "the chief purpose of government is the suppression of conflict
and tumult. Changes, or the respect for personal freedom or for justice, might endanger that order. . . .
Theologically, justice and love are supreme, but historically both are subordinated to order." Together, the
"Big Four" left a very problematical legacy of the relation of "classical" Christian theology to democratic
political thought and church-state relations. Any adequate theological or ethical rationale for religious
freedom or for pluralism as a positive good must look to other sources.
One such source, spiritual and ethical if not precisely theological, is the "Epilogue" from Vaclav Havel's
recent essays titled Summer Meditations. Writing of his own homeland but, by extension, of the whole of
Central Europe, Havel says:
We live . . . in a place that from the beginning of time has been the main European crossroads of
every possible interest, invasion, and influence of a political, military, ethnic, religious, or cultural
nature. The intellectual and spiritual currents of east and west, north and south, Catholic and
Protestant, enlightened and romantic -- . . . all these have been overlapped here, and bubbled away
in one vast cauldron.
Havel deduces from all this a special destiny for Central Europe and for Europe as a whole: Today, for the
first time in its history, this continent has a realistic chance to evolve into a single large society based on the
principle of `unity in diversity.' Yet this is more than a continental opportunity: it is, says Havel, a "global
interest," It is to make up for the bitter historic fact that, "for decades, Europe has dragged the rest of the
world into deadly conflicts."
It was my privilege, as a visiting ecumenical delegate, to participate in the first European Ecumenical
Assembly in Basel in May 1989. That Assembly, in word and worship and song, resounded with hopeful
visions of "a common European house." The Assembly's Final Document rang with calls to metanoia
(conversion to God): commitment to seeking ways out of the divisions in which the churches continue to
live, out of the suspicion and hostility in their mutual relations, out of the burden of paralyzing memories of
the past, out of intolerance and the refusal to recognize religious freedom, into a community which
recognizes its needs to be constantly forgiven and renewed, and together gives praise to God for His love
and gifts.
Particularly memorable from Basel was the address by Cardinal Roger Etchegaray of the Vatican's
Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, with his declaration that "`shalom' is the richest and juiciest
word in the Bible;" his prayer that the Basel Assembly might be a "a lucid and bold awakening so that,
despite the scandal of our divisions,we may together mend our ways and bear witness to the world that the
reign of peace and justice is already in the midst of us;" and finally Cardinal Etchegaray's wistful question
whether Christians could "achieve the audacity of being a Church which offers to humanity in distress this
miniature of paradise, a eucharistic community happy to live fully--if only for a fleeting moment--the peace
and justice of God upon Earth."
That little phrase, "if only for a fleeting moment," seemed to be an anticipation that such a eucharistic
community and the exhilarating dénouement of the Cold War then under way in 1989, with its "velvet
revolutions" and stunning transformations, might be followed, all too soon, by a new time of troubles for
Europe. And so it was. But a sign of hope comes from the recent decision in Assisi to hold a second
European Ecumenical Assembly in Graz, June 23-29, 1997, the theme of which is "Reconciliation: Gift of
God and Source of New Life." If the preeminent Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant leaders of Europe can
continue to manifest a highly visible solidarity for the sake of the common good of Europe, there is indeed
hope for the resolution of most religious, ethnic, and political conflicts on this continent.

There is, of course, a reciprocal relationship between the celebration of pluralism and the integrity of
religious freedom. Religious freedom itself is a concept that must be understood pluralistically, with a
diversity of meanings. It is a many-faceted topic. The great danger in discussing freedom is that we shall
neglect some of its facets, so that the existential possibility of freedom is actually precluded.
I shall sketch six facets of religious freedom. Those six I have rather abstractly labeled spiritual, juridical,
integral, intramural, ecumenical, and interfaith. But all six are interrelated and inseparable.
1. By spiritual freedom, I refer to our interior life of heart and mind an conscience. It is the freedom, and
the strength, to be faithful even in the face of bitter opposition or imprisonment or death. Martin Luther's
famous treatise, The Freedom of the Christian Man, testified to the liberating power of God's grace for a
life of love and faith, for any person, lay or clergy, in any walk of life, and for the whole of life. Yes, we
ought not forget that Luther suppressed heresy and helped princes suppress rebellion. So Luther's preaching
of religious freedom was not fully-faceted, to say the least. Still, his testimony to the freedom of the inner
life is an enduring treasure of our Christian faith: "A Christian man is the most free lord of all, subject to
none. A Christian man is the dutiful servant of all, subject to everyone."
Luther's words portray Jesus himself: in his whole ministry and especially in his Passion. But the spiritual
freedom of many others has also triumphed over external powers: St. Paul, Jan Hus, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Ruth von Kleist, Maximilian Kolbe, Martin Luther King, Jr., Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a host of saints
in Central and Eastern Europe who kept the faith during the harsh persecutions of the communist years.
In all of this, we may come to know that freedom is God's greatest gift. St. Paul wrote to the Galatians: "For
freedom Christ has set us free." (Gal. 5:1) Such freedom is essential to our very humanity. But such
freedom is to be shared with others in the love and peace of Christ. It is a commitment, not a license. Paul
also wrote: "Yes, you were called to freedom, brothers and sisters; only do not use your freedom as an
opportunity for self-indulgence." (Gal. 5:13)
This moral imperative of freedom--freedom as God's costly gift in Christ, freedom as the mark of our
humanity as well as our image of God, freedom as the priceless treasure of a loving community--was well
understood by perhaps the greatest Russian Christian thinker of this century, Nicholas Berdyaev, whose
faith and courage cost him the freedom of his own homeland. Berdyaev especially grasped the imperative
of freedom as a spiritual necessity. He once declared: "God has laid upon [humanity] the duty of being free,
of safeguarding freedom of spirit, no matter how difficult that may be, or how much sacrifice and suffering
it may require." Such soul-filled freedom, while it has led many a saint to martyrdom, has again and again
expanded the external living space of freedom within both religious and political institutions. So it is not a
purely interior thing after all.
It is to the institutional requirements of freedom that we now turn.
2. Juridical freedom is the range of religious liberty defined by law in constitutions and statutes, or
advocated in international covenants and declarations and in ecclesial pronouncements. It is the subject of
civil liberties and church-state relations.
It is no mere coincidence that, in the same year, the 1948 United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and
the 1948 World Council of Churches Declaration on Religious Liberty were so similar in their articulation
of the juridical bases of religious freedom. In fact, it was World Council leadership that decisively shaped
the language of the UN Declaration's Article 18 on religious freedom. A first UN draft was brief and
superficial, stipulating only that "there shall be freedom of conscience and belief and of private and public
religious worship." Obviously, the external expression of religious faith in public witness and service was
almost totally lacking in that draft. Thanks principally to the determined efforts of Dr. O. Frederick Nolde
of the WCC's Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), the final version of Article 18
was multi-faceted. It reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private
to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.
Those four external manifestations of faith--worship, teaching, practice, and observance--were emphasized
in the World Council's Amsterdam Declaration and have been repeatedly reinforced in subsequent WCC
statements.
The New Delhi Assembly of the World Council in 1961, in a new statement on religious liberty, provided
more specificity concerning the right of public witness, in this wording:
Freedom to manifest religion or belief includes freedom to practice religion or belief whether by
performance of acts of mercy or by the expression in word or deed of the implications of belief in
social, economic and political matters, both domestic and international.
So, religious freedom is much more than a private privilege of the individual to choose what she or he will
believe, or how he or she will pray. It is the right of an organized community of believers and worshippers
to address the power structures of society.
With the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the public witness of the churches has been freed to
take new forms, and not simply to return to the old forms of the pre-communist years. Inevitably, this
means new controversies and confusions. Here in Europe, and everywhere else in the world, there is great
need to think through and articulate what I call "political ecclesiology": namely, the style and shape of the
churches' faithful public witness to "the principalities and powers"--faithful to the Gospel of Jesus Christ
and, at the same time, responsive to religious pluralism and the construction of a free civil society in which
universal human rights are respected and protected.
Vatican II, after struggling through perhaps its most bitter disputes, offered a Declaration on Religious
Freedom (contained in the document Dignitatis Humanae), affirming that every person has a right to
"immunity from coercion" in religious matters -- and admitting that the Church itself has often violated that
principle. Subsequent statements from the Vatican have paralleled World Council pronouncements. On the
World Day of Peace, January 1, 1988, Pope John Paul II stated that
religious freedom, an essential requirement of the dignity of every person, is a cornerstone of the structure
of human rights. It follows that the freedom of individuals and of communities to profess and practice their
religion is an essential element for peaceful human existence.
There is thus very wide ecumenical commitment to the idea that religious freedom should be grounded in
concepts of universal human rights.
In 1981, the United Nations adopted a document specifically addressed to concerns central to our
conference here in Kecskemét: the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Underneath that long and cumbersome title is a clear principle
embodied in that Declaration's very definition of intolerance and discrimination: "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect
nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on an equal basis." That comprehensive statement of principle, if fully understood and effectively
taught by our churches, is an indispensable moral and spiritual safeguard against human enmity on
religious grounds. It is also an implicit curb on proselytism, which is a very troublesome concern in Europe
today (not least because of the hosts of imperialistic evangelists gushing forth from the United States). We
should recall the New Delhi Assembly's statement that proselytism can corrupt the very climate of religious
freedom, by subtle or open "cajolery, bribery, undue pressure or intimidation."

So: Equality among all religious groups is a juridical principle of church-state relations that precludes
special powers or privileges for any religious group denied to any other religious group. That principle was
already contained in the WCC's 1948 Amsterdam Declaration on Religious Liberty, which stated that the
churches' appeal for freedom must not involve asking for "any privilege to be granted to Christians that is
denied to others."
Whatever the churches have to say about religious freedom as a juridical principle--as a matter of law-must take account of the fact that the law tends to define church-state relations statically. But there is the
much larger dynamic and dialectical reality of relations between religion and politics which cannot be fully
captured in law. We cannot, and must not, expect or allow parliaments or courts or executive bureaucracies
to have the ultimate word on why and how the churches exercise their freedom. That is a theological task:
to provide faith's own reasons for juridical principles.
Moreover, the law of any state tends to see religion as one of the many elements within the state, and
therefore to domesticate religion, to encase it and nationalize it. But those Christians and Jews and Muslims
who truly affirm a radical monotheism, a universal faith, a world religion will never consent to be thus
domesticated.
I believe most Europeans, like most Americans, want a double-edged theology of freedom. We want the
church to be free. We want the state to be free. In principle, we don't want either institution to dominate or
manipulate the other. We believe that both religious and political loyalties are profoundly important and
that they must, and inevitably will, be related. Each needs the other. God speaks through both church and
the world outside the church, including government--not just the church.
Again, we need a political ecclesiology that preserves the autonomy of both church and state but somehow
connects them dialectically. It is this autonomy of both institutions--and the inevitable conflict in the
dialectic between them--that is the foundation and best bulwark of religious freedom. In a fundamental
sense, such autonomy requires a secular state: that is, a state in which no decisive political privilege is
granted to one religion that is denied to others. Perhaps an essentially secular state may take a variety of
forms, including even the symbolic preservation of an historic religious establishment (although we
Americans find that hard to comprehend)--providing that religious liberty is a vital juridical and existential
reality for every religious community, as it seems to be in Scandinavia and England.
A more fully theological understanding of the dialectic and the conflict requires at least the following four
elements: (1) A normative view of the state itself and its purposes in the governance of God. (2) A
conception of the distinctive mission and ministry of the church, and the political implications thereof. (3)
A perspective on human nature in both its divine possibilities and its empirical realities, also noting the
political implications thereof. (4) A doctrine of freedom in which religious liberty is articulated with those
other liberties which may make freedom an authentic condition for all citizens.
The New Testament offers both positive and negative views of the state: it is ordained by God and/or it is a
great beast. Negative views of the state can claim some theological rationalization from Augustine to
Luther to some conservative contemporaries. A generation ago, the renowned Swiss theologian, Emil
Brunner, offered this somber view:
Every state represents sin on the large scale; in history, in the growth of every state the most
brutal, anti-divine forces have taken a share. . . . In the state, we human beings see our own sin
magnified a thousand times.
Such a view may commend itself anew to some European Christians who have lived through the hard
Bolshevik years that somehow never came close to their utopian promise that the state would wither away.
But such a view also has some affinity with the anti-governmental, anti-political sentiments of so many
Americans: sentiments very much on the rise again in the conservative revolution that now dominates
American politics. After all, we Americans have had a business civilization since 1800: a civilization that

has nurtured our people to believe that business is good and government is bad--and that big business is
very good and big government is very bad.
Modern Roman Catholic thought has typically offered a much more positive view of the state, grounded in
Creation and the common good, reflecting Aristotle, Aquinas, and all true Christian humanists: we human
beings are political animals by the very fact of our humanity (and not simply because Adam ate the apple).
The state's role in promoting and protecting religious freedom has sometimes required the state to offer a
truer testimony to religious institutions themselves as to what freedom and human rights really require.
Moreover, patterns of church governance in many countries have been rendered more democratic through
the modeling of secular democratic institutions.
The state, then, can be viewed as a God-given order of Creation, a covenant for ordering the common good,
and even an instrument for the correction of the church itself. It is, of course, the bitter truth that the idea of
the state as an order of Creation has been abused by tyrannical regimes for idolatrous and wicked purposes,
as was the case in Germany's most corrupted years. Dietrich Bonhoeffer came to prefer the term "divine
mandate" to indicate God's imperatives at work in the institution of the state. So if we view the state as an
order of Creation, such a doctrine must be stripped of all divine sanctions for tyranny: it must be grounded
in God-given human rights and freedoms, the promotion and protection of which is the providential
mission of government.
A theological foundation for this topic should make clear that the church and the state have radically
different and conflicting claims with regard to time, territory, loyalty, and constituency.
With regard to time, the church has, for Christians, a different claim upon history and the end of history
than does a state which has only a provisional status and a limited life span. Nation-states and even the
most powerful empires rise and fall in the time perspectives of prophetic theology. Oscar Cullmann's study
of The State in the New Testament focuses precisely on this conflicting time-perspective. In Christ, there is
a "chronological dualism:" the end of history is now fulfilled, yet its consummation remains in the future.
The state's provisional status must be grasped within this historical dualism. Cullmann continues: "Because
the Gospel presents itself as the `politeuma,' the community of the coming age, it must accordingly see as
its most intrinsic concern its disposition toward the present `polis,' the secular state." All of which means
that the state can never be regarded as a definitive and ultimate reality. It is accepted for its necessary but
temporal and provisional character.
Even in temporal terms, the church is a community with continuities over the generations and centuries and
millennia which stretch far beyond all modern nation-states. The Church of Jesus Christ is much older than
any Western sovereignty. So, church and state have different time-frames.
With regard to territory, the church cannot be domesticated within the boundaries of any nation-state. The
church proclaims a sovereignty above all pretentious state claims to sovereignty: the Lord God is Sovereign
over all the nations. This conflict of sovereignties means that the church not only acts within the state: the
church acts upon the state from without. The church comes to the state in some respects as a stranger, an
alien. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose martyrdom in Nazi Germany incarnated these conflicting sovereignties,
testified that the church is foreign to the world; . . . Yet even this is always only an ever-renewed
consequence of that fellowship with the world which is given in the Body of Christ. The Church is divided
from the world solely by the fact that she affirms in faith the reality of God's acceptance of humanity, a
reality which is the property of the whole world.
So, the dialectic between church and state involves conflicting territorial claims and radically different
boundaries and conflicting sovereignties. Perhaps we need to redefine the theology of church-and-state to
become a "theology of church-and-states." Which is to say that, at least normatively, we must speak of the
unity and universality of the church over against the multiplicity of states. (Of course, the empirical reality
of the church is hardly one of unity.)

With regard to loyalty, the church cannot make any state the object of absolute devotion, for that would be
idolatry. Paul Lehmann viewed the church's loyalty in terms of koinonia, the beloved community of the
New Covenant which tests every other loyalty by its understanding of god's providential love in history:
The koinonia is the outpost of God's judgment upon every pattern and structure which seeks to
preserve and to justify itself by the idolatry of the status quo. And the koinonia is the outpost of
God's renewal, establishing new patterns and structures, commensurate with God's new
possibilities of living on the other side of those which are played out.
So, conflicting loyalties are central to political ecclesiology and the dialectic of church and state. And the
vindication of religious freedom, as well as other liberties, has often depended upon maintaining such
conflicts. Not all conflicts are to be resolved: some are to be preserved!
With regard to constituency, the church claims a much broader base than can any state or empire. After all,
the church is a transnational corporation, commissioned to serve the interests and needs of all peoples
everywhere. The oikoumene--the common household of faith among all the peoples of all the inhabited
Earth--offers a unique vantage-point from which to survey the claims and deeds of any state. Ecumenism
may, and must, seek to vindicate religious freedom, and other fundamental human rights, wherever in the
world they are abused or threatened. That means, all too often, coming into conflict with officers of state
and particular groups in various countries. It may indeed mean being dragged before governors and kings,
as Christ promises--or perhaps before courts or police forces.
But ecumenism itself must be more richly interpreted as a new synonym for peacemaking. And
peacemaking, which in secular language is concerned with "conflict resolution," is at the very heart of the
Gospel's "ministry of reconciliation."
If our practical agenda for "Christian Faith and Human Enmity" may indeed be the resources and skills of
conflict resolution, those cannot be just matters of technique for us: they must be the instruments of grace
empowered by the message of reconciliation.
The other facets of religious freedom can be more briefly stated--or, at least, they must be more briefly
stated in this paper.
3. To say that religious freedom is integral is to recognize that it is inextricably linked to all other human
rights. We need an expansive, wholistic conception of what religious liberty requires in any modern nation.
All those other freedoms--speech, press, assembly, petition, property, education, association--are the
necessary conditions for the fullness of religious freedom. A human right, to be meaningful, must be
vindicated with a substantial opportunity to practice the right. The social, political, and material facts of life
must not thwart such opportunity. Such a view of humanity in its wholeness is ultimately a theological
conception of abundant life as invited by Christ that expands and enriches our notions as to what religious
freedom is all about. Surely religious freedom must mean something more than atomistic individualism
within a free-market, laissez-faire economy.
Earlier I mentioned the May 1995 meeting in Assisi to project the next European Ecumenical Assembly in
1997. At Assisi, Father Waclaw Hryniewicz, professor at the Ecumenical Institute of the University of
Lublin in Poland, had this to say:
Collective materialism has been expelled from Eastern and Central Europe. Is it only to be replaced by an
ideology of individualist materialism? To survive, our culture needs a deeper meaning, a truly ecumenical
spirituality of the wholeness of our common life. It would be tragic if the churches of Europe fail to lay that
lasting foundation of a new Europe.
While constitutions, laws, and covenants provide the sanctions of last resort in defense of religious liberty,
the ultimate defenses must be nurtured and fortified in the attitudes and relationships among religious and

other groups in civil society. The three remaining facets of religious freedom concern just such defenses.
All of them involve the creation and reconciliation of true community.
4. To speak of intramural freedom is to vindicate the rights of expression and dissent within any particular
church body. While this issue is perhaps most vividly dramatized within such a hierarchical polity as the
Roman Catholic Church, it is by no means absent in most Christian churches. Mainline Protestantism in the
United States is currently beset with cries of "heresy!" and by a punitive mentality on the part of
reactionary groups, some of which are well-funded by corporate economic interests. (Can you imagine
why?) The climate and spirit of freedom within the church is therefore subject to secular pressures from
without. It is also profoundly affected by perceptions of the political roles played by church leaders. In
some of the churches of Central and Eastern Europe today, the possibility of intramural freedom is
constrained by bitter conflicts over the real or alleged collaboration of Christians with previous political
regimes, whether fascist or communist. In my country, some church members are frank to say they find it
more difficult to be honest in the church than in any other institution or setting--such are the social
pressures and the constraints against controversy and an atmosphere of full and free expression.
In 1987, the Human Rights Advisory Group of the World Council of Churches declared that "churches
should apply to themselves and their functioning as organizations the same norms of behavior and
parameters they may request state or civil authorities to respect." That declaration implies a very
demanding standard of ecclesial freedom paralleling civil freedom in all our nations. At the very least, we
may say that churches which do not, or cannot, practice respect for pluralism and freedom of belief and
conscience within their own fellowship may tend to give their members a trained incapacity to cope with
extramural pluralism and the freedoms of other citizens in their society.
5. To speak of ecumenical freedom is to advocate the fullest possible freedom to encounter, cooperate with,
be recognized by, and participate in the life of, other Christian communions. The World Council's historic
1982 Lima Text on Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry marked significant progress toward mutual
recognition in all three matters but (in Paragraph 26 on the Eucharist) confessed: "Insofar as Christians
cannot unite in full fellowship around the same table to eat the same loaf and drink from the same cup, their
missionary witness is weakened at both the individual and corporate levels." In an earlier paragraph (20),
the connection of the Eucharist's potential power with the issue of freedom was poignantly expressed:
The eucharistic celebration demands reconciliation and sharing among all those regarded as brothers and
sisters in the one family of God and is a constant challenge in the search for appropriate relationships in
social, economic, and political life. All kinds of injustice, racism, separation and lack of freedom are
radically challenged when we share in the body and blood of Christ. Through the eucharist the all-renewing
grace of God penetrates and restores human personality and dignity.
The Final document of the 1989 Basel Assembly, in quoting that very same paragraph, lamented that "the
separation of our churches is made most painfully aware to us at the Lord's table."
So, full ecumenical freedom remains an elusive and perhaps distant dream.
6. The final facet is interfaith freedom. Here the basic issue for freedom is whether the adherents of one
religion are able to discover and deeply respect the truth and the holiness in other religions as
manifestations of the spirit of one Living God and whether they will defend the freedom of other religions
as earnestly as they would their own. This is the ultimate test of religious pluralism and religious freedom.
It is a test which perhaps most of our nations have failed in the past. The peace of Europe and of the world
may well depend upon how Christians meet that test in times to come. Interreligious dialogue and practical
cooperation in works of justice and common service seem to be the main requirements.
In Barcelona in December 1994, in connection with UNESCO's 1995 "Year of Tolerance," leaders of
fifteen religions joined in a Declaration on the Role of Religion in the Promotion of a Culture of Peace.
Noting that even religiously-inspired "political regimes may do serious harm to religious values"

themselves, as well as to the common good, the signatories pledged: "We will remain mindful that our
religions must not identify themselves with political, economic, or social powers."
Another gift to all of us from Vatican II was Nostra Aetate, the Declaration on the Relationship of the
Church to Non-Christian Religions. While that document offered no detailed agenda on strategy, it did
encourage Christians
prudently and lovingly, through dialogue and collaboration with followers of other religions, and in witness
of Christian faith and life, to acknowledge, preserve, and promote the spiritual and moral goods found
among these people, as well as values in their society and culture.
In the spirit of Nostra Aetate, the Vatican's Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue in 1990 offered a
set of guidelines for dialogue between Christians and Muslims: guidelines whose spirit and essential norms
are applicable as well to ecumenical relations, intramural and congregational life, and civil society
generally. Notwithstanding their particular reference to Christian-Muslim relations, I am moved to suggest
that they are an appropriate conclusion to this entire discussion of "Pluralism and Religious freedom":
We cannot restrict the encounter between Christians and Muslims to circles of specialists or to visits by the
leaders of communities. Dialogue includes all aspects of life and can be found in every place where
Muslims and Christians live and work together, love, suffer and die. In fact the distinctiveness of dialogue
is not found in its purpose, but in a pattern of behavior, by which other persons are welcomed, their speech
is carefully heard and the fact of their differences accepted. To behave in that way, we do not have to be
great scholars or theologians, nor even to be advanced in the ways of holy living. It is enough to be people
of faith and hope, of good will and practical charity.

